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System Safety Processes
Problem
Critical risk factor needs scrutiny
 Scrutiny involves level of rigor
 Level of rigor requires code review
Reviewing AI/ML enabled functions 
via code review is not practicable
AI enabled autonomous functions = 
critical functions with no human 
monitoring or intervention
Therefore, avoiding code review 
requires lessening the autonomy of 
the AI enabled function
Examples of AI/ML Issues
Failure Category Failure Mode Examples





Human Machine Operation Issues
Operators have lack of trust in the system
Operators are overly trusting (overreliant) in the system
Operators ignore the system
Operators misunderstand the system recommendations/predictions 
Operators introduce errors into the system
System Under Attack (Cyber attack)
System is overtaken by adversary/adversary is controlling system
System and its outcomes are corrupted by adversary
Adversary jams or shuts down system
Adversary gains access to system; decision information/knowledge 
is compromised
•TABLE I.  Examples of AI System Failure Modes (Faria, 2017)
Faria, J. (2017, October 23-26). Non-determinism and failure modes in machine learning. Proceedings of IEEE 28th International 
Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering Workshops, 310-316.
Interdependence Analysis (IA)
Out of left field 
IA is used to determine the interdependence relations 
between a robot and a human.  Based on observability, 
predictability, and directability
Hypothesis:  IA will determine potential AI enable  
critical functions, and offer resolution ideas
Scenario
Nagy, B.N. (2021, March 25).    Using event-verb-event (EVE) constructs to train algorithms to recommend a complex mix of tactical actions 
that can be statistically analyzed. [On line conference presentation] Fifth Annual Naval Application of Machine Learning, San Diego, CA, United States.
Scenario Graphical User Interface
Nagy, B.N. (2021, March 25).    Using event-verb-event (EVE) constructs to train algorithms to recommend a complex mix of tactical actions that can be statistically analyzed.
[On line conference presentation] Fifth Annual Naval Application of Machine Learning, San Diego, CA, United States.
Interdependence Analysis
A. TASKS B. SUB 
TASKS 




F. OBSERVABILITY, PREDICTABILITY, AND DIRECTABILITY ASSESSMENT WRT 
NOSSA EVALUATIONS, PLUS SPECIFIC GUI FUNCTIONS FROM ABOVE 
P-thru GUI Map 
obstacles 
1. Use leg route & obstacle DB  Data Loader Manager User                    OPD-thru GUI and MDP  (1, 7) 
2. Use wx DB Data Loader Manager User OPD-thru GUI 
3. Use police intel DB Data Loader Manager User OPD-thru GUI 
Character
ize legs 
4. Use naive Bayes (nB) to determine best 
input attributes 
nB, DB Farm, DB Manager Evaluator                   OPD-thru GUI 
Leverage statistical output part of GUI to verify inputs for attributes make sense.  
(2, 3, 6)  
5. User Random Forest (RF) to estimate 
probability and missing attributes 
RF, DB Farm, DB Manager Evaluator                                   OPD-thru GUI 
While RF is a black box to evaluators, in this case techniques exist to prove that the 
results are useful.   Evaluators  need to understand this proof and how to apply.   




6. Apply temporal greedy search (TGS) to 
create robot /route candidates 
TGS, Business Rule Manager, 
DB Farm, DB Manager 
Evaluator OPD-thru GUI While TGS is an algorithm, it is not ML, no special attention required 
(1, 2, 3, 6, 7) 
7. Use non-linear optimization (NLO) to 
determine combos that provide highest 
likelihood of mission success 
  OPD-thru GUI  
While NLO is an algorithm, it is not ML, no special attention required 








8. Activate robots Processor, Power Regulator, 
and Power Supply 






9. Select robot as lead Main Navigation and 
Guidance Controller 
User OPD-thru GUI 
(1) 
Navigate 10, Access planned waypoint DB Main Navigation and 
Guidance Controller 
User OPD-thru GUI and MDP 
(1, 2, 7) 
Update status 
 
Main Navigation and 
Guidance Controller 
User OPD-thru GUI and MDP 




11. Compare up date to plan 
 
Main Navigation and 
Guidance Controller 
User OPD-thru GUI and MDP 
(1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7) 
12. Adjust location as necessary Main Navigation and 
Guidance Controller 
User OPD-thru GUI and MDP 
(1, 3, 7) 
Identify 
customer 
13. Use computer vision (CV) to identify 
customer 
Image DB and CV User, Recipient OPD-thru GUI and MDP;  CV is ML, so a human on the loop checking the identity as 
seen by the robot reduces “Autonomy”.  In other systems, this may not be feasible.  
May have to assume risk here.  (1, 4) 
14. Check time so delivery can be 
synchronous 
GPS Signal & SATCOM 
Transceiver, GPS Translator 
User OPD-thru GUI and MDP  ( 
(2,3,5) 
15. Deliver package Robot arms Recipient (1, 4, 7) 
 
Conclusions
• IA adds detail to those ML functional areas that need to be evaluated. 
• Not all designers appreciate the interdependence that should exist between user and 
the algorithm and therefore build no OPD connections.  This makes reducing 
“autonomy” infinitely harder.  Conducting IA rapidly speeds that discovery 
• Adding the three main fault areas of ML into the IA raises very specific 
evaluation details and questions are raised.  
• While it may not solve the emerging ML evaluation conundrum, it does add 
considerable detail to the kinds of discussions that system developers and NOSSA 
ought to consider, especially when evaluators use the root cause details to inform 
their questions.  
• Authors recommend adding a seventh column to IA table, suspect root 
causes and why, to the IA table
• Recommend NOSSA evaluators frequently review deployed system 
performance. 
• This scenario benefits from a very capable GUI already informed by a 
knowledge of IA; NOSSA evaluators should not expect all systems will be as 
well developed.  
Conclusions, continued
• Consider making an IA a requirement for submission of a system for NOSSA certification 
• Withhold updating training data sets to the deployed edge at this point, since processes 
are not well understood
• Each updates to training data sets ought to be reexamined by NOSSA.  Not a long term 
solution, though.  Needs more research, tie to OVERMATCH
• Updating training data sets is similar to Navy’s development security operations 
(DEVSECOPS) efforts to update patches to the Fleet in hours, not weeks. NOSSA should 
learn from those lessons learned; recognize training data set size makes over the air 
updates challenging and unreliable. 
• Introducing ML techniques into systems may suggest changes to standard SE practices, 
• New SE ‘Vee’ may change to be continuous for the entire lifecycle of a system.  This 
means, in theory, that NOSSA has a continuous responsible to monitor system safety.  
That is a significant change, and worth thinking about.  It may be that IA provides at least 
a way to wrap one’s head around this potentially new responsibility.  IA could be used to 
identify those functions that do require continuous evaluation.
